Your investigation of how the sewage plant broke was an interesting read.
The criticisms over a one-step design/build contract versus a more common two-step design-then-construct process were not fair, as each method has its strengths and weaknesses.
Proponents and detractors of each method exist with no side being able to claim that it is a paragon of excellence. It should be pointed out that municipal representatives would have been able to review, comment and ask for changes in the design. This would have been documented and come at a price, but it was obviously not a serious enough concern of HRM.
Stating that the safety controls on the generators should not have shut down the machinery in the event of an overload is a reckless conclusion. Safety controls are intended not only to protect the machinery, but also lives---the failure due to overloading this type of equipment can lead to catastrophic consequences far worse than a flooded sewage plant. It is just plain wrong to compare a sewage pump application to generators for fire systems. Codes and standards for fire safety are quite different from their industrial cousins and it is a mistake to suggest that the designers may have made an error in judgment.
The word "error" should have been used more cautiously by Mr. Bousquet; however, he and The Coast must be commended for lifting the web of secrecy on the events of January 14, and the ensuing shitstorm. —Red Mann, Halifax